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DUE PROCESS PROTECTION OF THE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED
MENTAL HEALTH PATIENT- Youngberg v. Romeo - In
Youngberg v. Romeo,' the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that the involuntarily committed mentally retarded pa-
tient has a constitutionally protected interest under the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment in reasonably safe
conditions of confinement and freedom from bodily restraints.
Further, the Court found that such a patient's liberty interest
includes the right to obtain minimally adequate training to pro-
mote personal safety and freedom from restraint.'
In 1974, Nicholas Romeo, a severely mentally retarded indi-
vidual, was involuntarily committed to the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital' on the application of his mother, pursuant
to the applicable provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act." Although he was physically thirty-
three years old, Romeo suffered from a chemical imbalance in
the brain that limited his mental capacity to approximately that
of an eighteen month old child.5 Romeo's father had died in May
of 1974. Shortly thereafter, the mentally retarded boy's mother
had applied to the local state court for the admission of her
child to a mental health facility. On June 11, 1974, the court
committed Romeo to the Pennhurst facility.6
While confined at Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on over
seventy occasions. Some of the injuries were self-inflicted.
Others were the result of attacks by facility residents. Certain of
these attacks were made in retaliation for Romeo's aggressive
1. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
2. Id. at 324.
3. Located in Spring City, Pennsylvania, Pennhurst is a large institution housing ap-
proximately 1,200 mentally retarded citizens. About half of the residents were committed
there by court order. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
4. Pennsylvania Health & Mental Retardation Act of 1966. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §
4406 (Purdon 1966). Under the language of this provision, commitment is ordered "for
care and treatment." Id.
5. 457 U.S. at 309-10. Romeo had an I.Q. between 8 and 10, could not talk, and lack-
ed the most basic self-care skills. Id. at 310.
6. Id.
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behavior.7 The injuries to Romeo were extensive. They included
a broken arm, a fractured finger, human bite marks, and
scratches.'
Because of inadequate medical attention, some of Romeo's
injuries became infected.' In some cases, infection resulted from
contact with human excrement, not properly disposed of by
Pennhurst staff.'0
Concerned about these injuries, Paula Romeo, Nicholas'
mother, filed an action as next friend to her son" in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
alleging that Pennhurst had violated Nicholas Romeo's constitu-
tional rights.'" It was alleged in the amended complaint's that
defendants had placed Romeo under physical restraint for pro-
longed periods of time.'4 Damages'" were claimed as compensa-
tion for defendants' alleged failure to provide Romeo with ap-
propriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation.""
At the ensuing trial, the district court instructed the jury
that the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition contained in
the eighth amendment was the proper standard by which to de-
7. Id.
8. Other injuries included injuries to the sexual organs, black eyes and various lacera-
tions. The fact of these injuries was not refuted by the medical staff at Pennhurst. Ro-
meo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3rd Cir. 1980).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. This action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purpose of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Colum-
bia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
12. Romeo originally claimed that his rights were violated under the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. 457 U.S. at 310.
13. Id. at 311. This was filed in December, 1977, over one year after inception of the
lawsuit.
14. Id. He was restrained for portions of each day, by the use of "soft" restraints.
15. Id. The claim was originally for damages and injunctive relief. However the claim
for injunctive relief was later dropped because Romeo was a member of a class seeking
such relief in another action.
16. The word "treatment" is used synonymously with "habilitation" or "training."
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termine defendants' liability.17 A verdict was returned for the
defendants."'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and re-
manded for a new trial, holding that the fourteenth amend-
ment,19 rather than the eighth, provided the proper constitu-
tional basis for the asserted rights.20 The court reasoned that the
eighth amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment of
those convicted of crimes, is not an appropriate source for deter-
mination of the rights of the involuntarily committed in a civil
context.2 Applying the fourteenth amendment, the court found
that the involuntarily committed mentally retarded retain a lib-
erty interest in freedom of movement and in personal security.2 2
Freedom of movement and personal security were determined to
be "fundamental liberties," limitation of which could be prop-
erly justified only by an "overriding, non-punitive" state inter-
est.2 3 The court found further that the involuntarily committed
mentally retarded have a liberty interest in habilitation designed
to "treat" their mental retardation.2 4
The Third Circuit concluded that physical restraint in a
hospital setting raised a presumption of a punitive sanction and
could be justified adequately only by a "compelling necessity"
on the part of the state institution.2 5 A somewhat different stan-
dard was deemed appropriate for the evaluation of an institu-
tion's failure to provide for the safety of its residents.26 The ma-
jority found such a failure justifiable upon a showing by the
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This amendment states as follows: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
18. 457 U.S. at 312.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This amendment states in part as follows:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within the jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
Id. § 1.
20. 644 F.2d at 156.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 164.
23. Id.' at 158.
24. Id. at 164-70.
25. Id. at 159-60. The court found that shackling squarely collides with a traditional
liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint. Id.
26. Id. at 163-64.
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state of a "substantial necessity" for the absence of safe condi-
tions. Finally, the Third Circuit majority held that where
treatment has been administered by an institution, those re-
sponsible for the treatment are liable to the patient only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge."2" In a concurring opinion which
would form the basis for the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
on appeal, Third Circuit Chief Judge Seitz argued that the ap-
propriate standard by which all implicated constitutional inter-
ests should be judged is that of whether defendants' conduct
"was such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not base
their conduct on a professional judgment. 2 9
The United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of
the court of appeals and remanded the action for further pro-
ceedings.30 The majority held that Romeo had constitutionally
protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment in reasonably safe conditions of confine-
ment, freedom from bodily restraints, and such minimially ade-
quate training as reasonably might be required by those inter-
ests." The Court adopted the reasoning of Third Circuit Chief
Judge Seitz' concurrence in regard to the proper weight to be
given the interests of the aggrieved mentally retarded patient
and the defending state institution.2 Proper protection would
be given patient's constitutional rights in state actions affecting
patient's safety, freedom, and treatment if, the Court said, the
institution could demonstrate that "professional judgment in
fact was exercised" in its decision. 3
27. Id. The court found that substantial necessity was more appropriate than the
compelling necessity standard employed in connection with the shackling claim, "for it
enables a court and jury to distinguish between isolated incidents and inadvertent inci-
dents, on the one hand, and persistent disregard of patients' needs on the other." Id. at
164.
28. Id. at 169.
29. Id. at 178 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
30. 457 U.S. at 325.
31. Id. at 324.
32. Id. at 321.
33. Id. The Justices found this standard lower than the "compelling" or "substan-
tial" necessity tests that the court of appeals would require, reasoning that the Third
Circuit's tests would place an "undue burden on the administration of institutions such
[Vol. 1290
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Although the Supreme Court found that Romeo was enti-
tled to minimally adequate training, 4 training required by the
Constitution was limited to that which is found reasonable in
light of the retarded patient's liberty interest in safety and free-
dom from physical restraints. 5 In determining what is "reasona-
ble" the Supreme Court held, courts must show deference to the
judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 6 The decision of
a professional in these circumstances, the Court held, would be
"presumptively valid. 37
I. BACKGROUND
The central issue with which courts must deal in any action
involving the mentally retarded person committed to an institu-
tion for care is the kind of treatment that person is entitled to
receive. Treatment of the mentally retarded has changed drasti-
cally since the time when institutionalization for such persons
meant little more than incarceration. 8 Despite recognition in
the medical community during the nineteenth century that the
mentally retarded had the ability to learn some skills," the prac-
tice of institutional care as late as the 1950's was limited, char-
acteristically, to a kind of "warehousing" designed to segregate
the retarded person from society. °
as Pennhurst...." Id. at 322.
34. Id.
35. Id. On the basis of the record, the Court found it uncertain whether Romeo
sought training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. Id. at 318. In his
brief to the Supreme Court, respondent disavowed any claim to such treatment as would
enable him "to achieve his maximum potential." Id. at 318 n.23.
36. Id. at 323 n.30. The term "professional," as defined by the Court, refers to a
person "competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular
decision at issue." Id. Chief Justice Burger, in concurrence, argues that this definition
would not allow a person to challenge the professional's practice, even if such practice
were inconsistent with generally accepted professional practice, due to the fact that it
was prescribed by the institution's professional staff. Id. at 321 (Burger, C.J., concurring
in the judgment).
37. Id. at 324. The deference that must be paid to the medical profession was
stressed throughout the opinions in this decision. The impact of this presumption will be
analyzed later in this comment.
38. I. AMARY, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED--DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED
TO TREATMENT AND EDUCATION 4-6 (1980).
39. I. AMARY, supra note 38, at 5.
40. Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 CiN. L. REv. 679
(1974). These conditions have been described as follows: "Regarded as sub-human beings
1983l
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In the 1960's a full recognition was achieved among profes-
sionals in the health field that the retarted have the capacity to
develop skills and to use those skills in society.4 1 Treatment pro-
grams established in the 1960's were curtailed a decade later,
however, as funds available for the operation of state care facili-
ties became scarce.' 2 Conditions of care deteriorated4 and the
deterioration prompted suits on behalf of institutionalized re-
tarded persons for improved conditions." Courts were con-
fronted with the task of determining the content of the rights of
the mentally retarded. Of all such rights asserted, the "right to
treatment" has been one of the most difficult to define.
In Rouse v. Cameron,'4 a case which one commentator be-
lieves initiated the redefinition of the legal rights of the mentally
retarded which began in the 1960's, 46 a court of appeals sug-
gested in dictum that a failure to treat the mentally retarded
patient involuntarily committed might violate constitutional
standards of due process and equal protection and the prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment.'7 In Wyatt v. Stickney,' 8
a district court decided that mentally retarded persons are enti-
tled to treatment, when committed involuntarily to a state insti-
tution, in the "least restrictive" environment.49 The court estab-
lished standards for institutional care that would ensure
they [mentally retarded] were chained in specially designed kennels and cages like wild
beasts and thrown into prisons, bridewells, and jails like criminals." Id. at 695 (quoting
A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 53 (2d ed. 1949)).
41. I. AMARY, supra note 38, at 8.
42. I. AMARY, supra note 38, at 5.
43. Id.
44.. For a list of representative cases, see Comment, The "Bill of Rights" of the De-
velopmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Did Not Create Substantive
Rights for the Mentally Retarded to Appropriate Treatment in the Least Restrictive
Environment, 58 N.D.L. REv. 119, 123 n.24 (1982).
45. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
46. Comment, supra note 44, at 124. This author felt that Rouse was the starting
point for the judiciary's redetermination of the rights of the mentally retarded.
47. 373 F.2d at 453.
48. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
supplemented 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Anderbolt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The Wyatt decision was relied
upon in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1317-18
(E.D. Pa. 1977), where the court found a constitutional right to minimally adequate
habilitation.
49. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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constitutionally adequate treatment and habilitation."
In two subsequent cases decided in the 1970's, Jackson v.
Indiana" and O'Connor v. Donaldson," the Supreme Court had
open before it the issue of a constitutional right to treatment for
persons involuntarily committed to mental institutions. Al-
though the Court did not address the constitutional issue di-
rectly in either case, its decisions lent support to the belief that
a right to treatment did exist and would be acknowledged by the
Court in the future.
In Jackson, the Court was faced with an appeal by a
twenty-seven year old mentally retarded deaf mute who had
been charged with a crime but who the criminal court had deter-
mined was incompetent to stand trial. 8 Under pertinent Indiana
state law, the trial court had ordered Jackson committed until
such time as the state health department could certify petit-
itoner's sanity to the court." Counsel for Jackson argued that
his client's commitment to a facility of the Indiana Department
of Mental Health amounted to a "life sentence" before convic-
tion, depriving Jackson of his fourteenth amendment rights."
Were it not for the criminal charges lodged against Jackson,
counsel argued, the state would have had to follow procedures
for commitment of the feeble-minded or mentally-ill in order to
place Jackson in a state institution. These statutes provided due
process protections greater than those in the indefinite confine-
ment statute used against Jackson." Petitioner asserted that in-
definite commitment under Indiana law deprived him of consti-
50. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395-407 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The standards
include the following:
(1) A statement of the least restrictive habilitation conditions necessary to
achieve the purpose of commitment; (2) a description of intermediate and long-
range habilitation goals, with a projected timetable for their attainment; (3) a
statement and rationale for the plan of habilitation for achieving these interme-
diate and long-range goals; (4) a specification of staff responsibility and a
description of proposed staff involvement with the patient in order to attain
these habilitation goals; (5) criteria for release to less restrictive conditions; and
(6) criteria for discharge.
Comment, supra note 44, at 125 n.38 (1982).
51. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
52. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
53. 406 U.S. at 730.
54. Id. at 730.
55. Id. at 730, 738.
56. Id. at 723.
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tutional due process and subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment.87
The Supreme Court held that Indiana's indefinite commit-
ment of a criminal defendant solely on the ground of his lack of
capacity to stand trial violated guarantees of due process." The
Court found that a defendant could not be held for more than
the period of time reasonably necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency
in the future. 9 The Court stated that "at the least, due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed." 60
In O'Connor v. Donaldson," the Supreme Court faced the
right to treatment question in the context of the case of an in-
voluntarily committed mental patient. Respondent had been
confined for almost fifteen years "for care, maintenance, and
treatment" as a mental patient in a Florida state hospital. Com-
mitted by his father, 2 Donaldson had made repeated attempts
to secure release from the hospital.8 His complaint alleged vio-
lations of rights during his years of confinement.6 4
Although the Court declined to decide the question of
whether Donaldson had a right to treatment in the Florida insti-
tution,65 it did hold that "a State cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of sur-
viving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
and responsible family members and friends."66
The Jackson and O'Connor cases, without providing for a
right to treatment for the involuntarily committed mentally re-
57. Id. at 719.
58. Id. at 738.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
62. This action, similar to Youngberg v. Romeo, was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 422 U.S. at 565. Under this section, the plaintiff alleged a deprivation of liberty.
The circuit court found that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed a right to treatment
for involuntarily committed mental patients. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520
(5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
63. Id. at 573.
64. 422 U.S. at 567.
65. 422 U.S. at 573.
66. Id.
[Vol. 1
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tarded, did offer encouragement to those who sought the recog-
nition of such a human right. Both cases established constitu-
tional limits on a state's power in regard to the involuntarily
committed patient in a mental institution.
After Jackson and O'Connor, Courts of Appeal for the
Eighth and the Third Circuits addressed the right to treatment
issue. In 1978, the Eighth Circuit considered the substantive
rights of an involuntarily committed mental patient under the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment in Goodman
v. Parwatikar. 67 The committed individual in Goodman charged
that she had received constitutionally inadequate treatment. 8 In
giving instructions to the district court for remand proceedings
in this § 1983 action, the Eighth Circuit stated that "the Due
Process Clause compels minimally adequate treatment be pro-
vided for involuntary patients in state institutions."69
In March of 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit faced the right to treatment issue in Scott v.
Plante.7 0 In this case, another § 1983 proceeding, the patient
Plante had been confined to a psychiatric hospital since 1955,
when a Burlington County, New Jersey jury had determined
that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial.7 1 Although
Plante's action arose in the context of a criminal case, it
presented the issue of the right to treatment of an involuntarily
committed mental patient. Citing its earlier decision in Romeo v.
Youngberg which case was then awaiting a grant of certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court, the Third Circuit found that
involuntarily committed mental patients, whether mentally ill or
retarded, have a constitutionally protected right to treatment..'
Later in 1981, the right to treatment issue was put squarely
before the United States Supreme Court in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman.73 The Court, however, chose
not to decide the case on constitutional grounds, 4 reaching its
determination instead on the basis of the Developmentally Dis-
67. 570 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1978).
68. Id. at 802.
69. Id. at 804.
70. 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981).
71. Id. at 120.
72. Id. at 125.
73. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
74. Id. at 11.
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abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDAA). 75 The Court
held that § 601071 of the Act does not create in favor of the men-
tally retarded any substantive rights to "appropriate treatment"
in the "least restrictive" environment."
The Pennhurst decision encountered sharp criticism in the
legal community. 78 Penelope Boyd, an attorney who represented
patient Halderman in the Pennhurst case before the Supreme
Court, argues persuasively in a post-decision commentary that
Congress clearly intended to confer an individually held right to
treatment on the mentally retarded patient through the
DDAA. 79 She crticizes the Supreme Court for reducing provi-
sions granting such a right under the Act "to mere precatory
language."80
"Title II [of the Act]," Boyd states, "is designed to assist in
the protection of human rights under the Constitution of those
mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled individu-
als who require institutional care or need community facilities
and programs."8' The Court, however, had preferred to empha-
size the "assistance" language of the statute over its "rights"
language, an act of extraordinary deference to the states.82 Rec-
ognizing that Pennhurst was decided narrowly on the basis of §
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Act begins with an exhaus-
tive statement of purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(1). The "specific purposes" of the Act are
to "assist" and financially "support" various activities necessary to the provision of com-
prehensive services to the developmentally disabled.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). It is interesting to note that absent from
this section is any language suggesting that § 6010 is a "condition" for the receipt of
federal funding under the Act.
77. 451 U.S. at 22-23. After a careful study of the language and congressional intent,
the Court determined that the lower court had "failed to recognize the well-settled dis-
tinction between congressional 'encouragement' of state programs and the imposition of
binding obligations on the States." Id. at 27. The Court succinctly stated that "when
Congress intended to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds . . . it proved ca-
pable of doing so in clear terms." Id. at 23. "The existence of explicit conditions through-
out the Act, and the absence of conditional language in § 6010, manifest the limited
meaning of § 6010." Id.
78. See generally Boyd, The Aftermath of the DD Act: Is There Life After Pen-
nhurst?, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 448 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Aftermath]. See
also Note, Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman, 35 Sw. L.J. 959, 961 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited as Legal Rights].
79. Aftermath, supra note 78, at 459-60.
80. Id. at 466.
81. Id. at 459.
82. Id.
[Vol. 1
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6010 of the DDAA, critics agreed nevertheless that the decision
indicated the Supreme Court was now disinclined to look favora-
bly upon assertions of substantive rights for the mentally
retarded. 3
Against this background, the Supreme Court chose to con-
sider the fourteenth amendment rights of the involuntarily com-
mitted mentally retarded patient in Youngberg v. Romeo.8 4
II. THE DECISION
Respondent Romeo argued that he had constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interests in safety, freedom of movement, and
training within the mental health institution"5 and that petition-
ers had infringed upon these rights by failing to provide the re-
quired conditions of confinement.8 6 Noting that the parties
agreed that respondent had a right to adequate food, shelter,
clothing, and medical care while confined, 87 the Court went on to
consider the asserted liberty interests of the patient in safety,
freedom of movement, and training.8
At the outset, the Court stated clearly that patient's as-
serted liberty interests in safety and freedom from bodily re-
straint had been established in prior Supreme Court decisions
by inference from the recognized rights of convicted criminals.8'
Considering the question of safe conditions, the Court stated
that "if it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted
criminals90 in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to
confine the involuntarily committed [mental patient]-who may
not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions." 91 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell found that the individual's interest in
freedom from bodily restraint has always been recognized as
83. Id. at 466.
84. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
85. Id. at 315.
86. Id.
87. Id. See also Brief for Petitioners at 8, 11, 12 and Brief for Respondents at 15-16,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
88. 457 U.S. at 315.
89. Id. While the Court states that the petitioners do not appear to argue to the
contrary, the cited cases dealt with penal confinements.
90. See id. at 315-16.
91. Id.
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"the core of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."92
Since this interest, like that of safe conditions, survives criminal
conviction and incarceration, the majority reasoned that it must
survive civil involuntary commitment.93 Having acknowledged
the established rights to freedom from unsafe conditions and
from unnecessary bodily restraint, the Court addressed peti-
tioner's claim that he was entitled to "minimally adequate
habilitation."94
In their consideration of Romeo's claims, the judges of the
Third Circuit had endorsed unanimously the right of the invol-
untarily committed mentally retarded patient to freedom from
physical restraint, to safe conditions, and to treatment.95 These
rights were not found to be absolute, however. They were to be
balanced against the interests of the state institution in efficient,
economical operation. 6
The Court of Appeals majority had determined that only a
"compelling" state necessity could justify physical restraint of
the involuntarily committed mentally retarded patient;97 only a
"substantial necessity" could justify a failure to provide for a
patient's safety9" and, where treatment had been administered,
the adequacy of the treatment would offend constitutional stan-
dards, "only if treatment is not 'acceptable in the light of pre-
sent medical or other scientific knowledge.'""9
Chief Judge Seitz of the Third Circuit, however, writing in
concurrence, determined that the majority had given too little
weight to the decisions of institutional personnel in matters of
patient restraint, safety, and treatment. 100 These three aspects
of patient care, he believed, were essentially inseparable in
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. In comparison with the other constitutional claims, the Court finds the "right
to treatment" claim "more troubling" due to the fact that the context of the term "habil-
itation" is sharply disputed among members of the medical profession. Id. at 316 n.20.
Also, the Court refuses to address the question of whether Romeo has a state substantive
right to habilitation raising substantive, not procedural protection under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Id. at 316 n.19.
95. 644 F.2d at 158-59.
96. Id. at 159.
97. Id. at 160.
98. Id. at 164
99. Id. at 169.
100. Id. at 178.
[Vol. 1298
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clinical practice.'01 Judge Seitz opined that in all three areas
"the Constitution only requires that professional judgment was
exercised, 1 °2 and that a constitututional breach would occur
only if decisions by institution staff in regard to patient safety,
freedom from restraint, and training were "such a substantial
departure from accepted standards [as to demonstrate]. . . that
no professional judgment was in fact used.' 103
Writing for the Supreme Court majority in Romeo, Justice
Powell adopted the unanimous position of the Third Circuit that
the interests of the patient in freedom from restraint, safety,
and treatment are not absolute,1" and must be balanced against
the interests of the state institution in determining whether a
violation of patient's rights has occurred.105 Justice Powell
found, however, that the weight to be given state decisions on
restraint, safety, and treatment had been correctly expressed,
not in the Third Circuit majority opinion, but in Judge Seitz'
concurrence.10°
Applying the Seitz position, that professional judgment is
entitled to substantial deference from the courts,0 1 Justice Pow-
ell reduced the level of state justification necessary to overcome
the liberty interests of the patient in safety and freedom from
restraint, as defined by the Third Circuit majority, from "com-
pelling" and "substantial" to a lower level less burdensome to
the mental health institution.0 8
It is in the area of the right to treatment, however, that ap-
101. Id. at 175.
102. Id. at 178.
103. Id.
104. 457 U.S. at 320. The Supreme Court reasoned that in operating an institution
such as Pennhurst "there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to restrain
the movement of residents." Id.
105. Id. The Court classifies the question in this case as one of substantive due pro-
cess, which differs from a procedural due process question (similar to Jackson), where a
higher test would be required. Id. at 320 n.27. In this case, the purpose of petitioner's
commitment was to provide reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to him
outside an institution. Id. One author has suggested that the Supreme Court should
adopt the strict scrutiny standard, because in his opinion, the mentally retarded form a
suspect class. Note, Parental Rights of the Mentally Retarded: The Advisability and
Constitutionality of the Treatment of Retarded Persons in New York State, 16 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoss. 521 (1981).
106. Id. at 321.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 322.
19831 299
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plication of the Seitz standard by the Supreme Court majority
had its most limiting effect. Judge Seitz had argued that the
Constitution was satisfied if professional judgment was used in
the denial of "minimally adequate care and treatment" to the
involuntarily committed mentally retarded patient. 09 The kind
of minimal treatment to which Judge Seitz referred in his con-
currence, however, was "that education, training, and care re-
quired by retarded individuals to reach their maximum develop-
ment. '"11 Justice Powell, for the Supreme Court majority,
applies the Seitz standard to a different, sharply restricted defi-
nition of "treatment." The Court majority accepts, at the outset,
the proposition that once a state adopts the practice of institu-
tionalizing patients, 1 ' a duty to provide certain services is cre-
ated.1 2 The full extent of those mandated services, however,
"treatment per se"' 3 is found not to be at issue in Romeo. Peti-
tioner Romeo's argument that certain self-care programs were
necessary to reduce his aggressive behavior led the Supreme
Court majority to conclude that the only treatment at issue was
that training "related to safety and freedom from restraint. '"9 4
Hence, the restrictive standards of Judge Seitz' concurrence
in the Third Circuit are applied to a restrictive definition of
"treatment" deemed to be at issue by the Supreme Court. The
result is a definition of petitioner Romeo's liberty interest in
treatment as a requirement that "the State ...provide mini-
mally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and free-
109. 644 F.2d at 178.
110. Id. at 176.
111. 457 U.S. at 317. Citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court concludes that "[a]s a general matter a State is under no
constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border." 457 U.S.
at 317.
112. The Court goes on to qualify this duty by stating that "a State necessarily has
considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities." Id.
113. Although Justice Powell chose not to consider this issue, Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the judgment, stated that "I would hold flatly that respondent has no con-
stitutional right to training, or 'habilitation,' per se." Id. at 329 (Burger, C.J., concurring
in the judgment).
114. The Court states that "[o]n the basis of the record before us, it is quite uncer-
tain whether respondent seeks any 'habilitation' or training unrelated to safety and free-
dom from bodily restraints." Id. at 318. In the brief to the Supreme Court, and in oral
argument, respondent explicitly disavowed any claim that he was constitutionally enti-
tled to such treatment as would enable him to achieve his maximum potential. Id. at 318
n.23.
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dom from undue restraint." 18 Stating that it intended to curb
the exercise of judicial review of state action in this area, the
Court held that decisions by medical personnel related to such
training would be "presumptively valid: liability may be im-
posed only when the decision by the professional is such a sub-
stantial departure from accepted professional judgment practice
or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actu-
ally did not base the decision on such a judgment."" 6
Thus, the Romeo decision may be understood as a heighten-
ing of protection for mental health decision makers from liabil-
ity for the provision of extensive patient treatment and from
close judicial scrutiny of their actions.
The Supreme Court majority vacated the decision of the
Court of Appeals and remanded the action for further proceed-
ings on grounds that the trial jury had been instructed errone-
ously to determine defendants' liability on the basis of the
eighth amendment. 1
7
Concurring in the opinion of the majority, Justices Black-
mun, Brennan, and O'Connor address two separate questions. 18
First, the Justices question whether the state of Pennsylvania
could accept the patient Romeo for "care and treatment" under
state statute and then refuse to provide him "treatment" as de-
fined by the statute.' The concurring Justices suggest that
those circumstances might constitute a violation of patient's due
process rights since commitment without any treatment would
not bear a reasonable relation to the ostensible purposes for
which confinement was effected.'
115. Id. at 319.
116. Id. at 323.
117. 457 U.S. at 325.
118. Id. (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. This question has been considered by other writers in the field of mental
health. As one author points out: "[c]ommitment is usually justifiable only for the pur-
pose of providing treatment." Comment, 16 HAv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 205, 210 (1981). An-
other author points out that the State's legitimizing "reason for allowing commitment of
the mentally disordered persons is the belief that they are especially treatable." Morse,
A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 65 (1982). It must be noted that under the Pennsylva-
nia Statute (Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 §
4406(b) (Purdon 1966)), the justification for commitment is "treatment."
120. 457 U.S. at 326. According to the three concurring Justices, "[i]f a state court
orders a mentally retarded person committed for care and treatment . . . due process
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The second issue addressed by the three concurring Justices
concerned whether Romeo had an independent constitutional
claim, grounded in the fourteenth amendment, to that training
necessary to preserve those basic self-care skills 2' he possessed
when he entered the Pennhurst mental health institution. 2 The
concurrence states that, had the issue been before the Court in
Romeo, it might have found this type of training to be constitu-
tionally required. 28 The statement of the three Justices is signif-
icant as an indication of their willingness to extend the treat-
ment constitutionally required, in certain circumstances, beyond
the level of that necessary to ensure patient safety and freedom
from undue restraint.12 4
Chief Justice Burger concurred separately in the Court's de-
cision. The Chief Justice states clearly that he "would hold flatly
that respondent [Romeo] has no constitutional right to training,
or 'habilitation,' per se."" Chief Justice Burger reasons that al-
though some amount of self-care instruction may be necessary,
it is clear that "the Constitution does not otherwise place an af-
firmative duty on the State to provide any particular kind of
training or habilitation-even . . . 'minimally adequate
training. "126
CONCLUSION
The Romeo decision is, at best, a partial and uncertain vin-
dication of the rights of the involuntarily committed mentally
retarded. Although the Court has recognized that liberty inter-
ests of involuntarily committed patients do exist, it has declined
might well bind the State to ensure that the conditions of his commitment bear some
reasonable relation to each of these goals." Id. (emphasis in original). According to the
majority and concurring Justices, however, this claim under state law was not properly
raised in the lower court. d.
121. Id. at 327. The Court lists two of these skills as "the ability to dress himself and
care for his personal hygiene." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 329. In the view of the concurring Justices "it would be consistent. . . to
include ...such training as is reasonably necessary to prevent a person's pre-existing
self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment." Id. at 327 (emphasis in
original).
124. Id. at 329.
125. Id. at 329 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment). See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
126. Id. at 330.
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to extend those rights to include a "right to treatment '' 7 other
than that treatment necessary to promote safety and freedom
from bodily restraint. Further, the Court's finding that the pro-
fessional judgment of institution staff is entitled to a presump-
tion of validity " may raise significant obstacles to successful
prosecution of claims by mentally retarded patients alleging
abridgment of their Constitutional rights. As Chief Justice Bur-
ger states, it is not inconceivable that even if the involuntarily
committed patient were to establish that an institution's train-
ing programs were not consistent with prevailing medical prac-
tice, that such proof would not provide the patient with a valid
cause of action so long as the training program had been pre-
scribed by the institution's medical staff.129
Through Romeo, the Supreme Court has limited the signifi-
cance of federal judicial review of the decisions of state institu-
tions in regard the rights of the involuntarily committed men-
tally retarded. Effective challenges to institution decisions,
however, may still be brought in the forum of the state courts.15
Indeed, in light of the recent decision by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in In Re Schmidt, 13 it is reasonable to anticipate
an increase in state court actions related to this area of law. It is
inevitable, in turn, that the United States Supreme Court will be
called upon to review again the claims of the involuntarily com-
mitted mentally retarded to Constitutional protections. More
comprehensive claims than those made for Nicholas Romeo will
offer the Court opportunities for examination of a full range of
patient's rights issues.
For the moment, however, those seeking a definition of the
rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded must
turn to Romeo. After the Pennhurst decision, one author stated
127. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
128. This presumption was granted with full knowledge that it would serve to limit
judicial review. 457 U.S. at 323. The Court finds that this presumption should also limit
interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of the institution. Id. at
322. Above all, the Supreme Court finds no reason to think that judges or juries are
better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. Id.
129. Id. at 331.
130. Id. at 324 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. See Legal Rights, supra note 7S, at 971. Just prior to the Pennhurst decision,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized a right under state law to habilitation in an
individualized fashion in the least restrictive environment. In Re Joseph Schmidt, 494
Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981).
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that, for the understanding of the rights of involuntarily com-
mitted mentally retarded patient, the Court's opinion "simply
muddies the water."18' The decision in Romeo has had, unfortu-
nately, much the same effect.
Bradley Nicholas Schulz
132. 5 MNrAL DumIyrrv L. RE. 139 (1981).
304 [Vol. 1
